Ibrahim Aljabin
It won’t be long before the frantic race to normalize relations with Assad’s regime becomes clearer, whether this normalization is Arab, Turkish, or international. The impatience of the parties benefiting from or harmed by normalization will further clarify the ambiguity surrounding the calls to meet with Assad.
Groups affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its branches in Syria (SDF and QSD) want to encourage Arab normalization with Assad, coupled with official recognition of the unilateral situation they have tried to impose on the Syrian people. This situation represents a form of self-administration not based on a popular referendum involving all Syrians, who have the sovereign right to determine their destiny and the form of their state.
On the other hand, Turkey seeks normalization with Assad that does not recognize anything established by the Kurdish militia in Syria, both civilian and military. Ankara and the majority of Syrians consider this a form of separatism threatening the unity of Syria and neighboring countries—Turkey and Iraq first—before breaking the Sykes-Picot borders and the international boundaries east and west.
Although the Assad regime created, supported, and armed the PKK, allowing it to exploit the Kurdish community in northern Syria in the 1980s and 1990s, it later halted its operations under Turkish threat and improved Syrian-Turkish relations under the Adana Agreement. However, it resumed its activities in 2011, using it against Kurdish protesters and handing over areas and facilities in Al-Hasakah province, along with secretive security and oil agreements. Yet, Assad’s regime has not officially recognized any of the PKK’s self-administration declarations, continually attacking and accusing them of separatism and American collaboration after using these militias in the fight against ISIS, similar to the use of the Popular Mobilization Forces and sectarian militias in Iraq.
Iraq, supporting Turkish normalization with Assad and offering to host a meeting between Erdogan and Assad in Baghdad to facilitate the process, has a clear stance against the PKK and its formations in Syria. They are seen as a threat that exacerbates Iraq’s distorted federalism, which was built on ethnic and sectarian divisions with American and Iranian support, leading to further fragmentation amid calls for turning Sulaymaniyah into a separate Kurdish region from Barzani’s Kurdistan.
The Barzanis consistently reiterate their fundamental opposition to the PKK, considering it a terrorist organization that they have paid dearly for due to its alliance with Iranians in the Qandil Mountains, fearing that what has been created in the three eastern Syrian provinces might one day devour Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, Iraqi Kurdistan, aligning with the central Iraqi government, does not grant any recognition to Ocalan’s self-administration in Syrian territories.
Some Biden administration allies might have no objection if asked to recognize the entity managed by the PKK in Syria, and some European countries would follow suit as long as it aligns with the American stance, especially under the current circumstances and the Russia-Ukraine war.
Iran has no objection to further complicating matters, ensuring chaos that allows it to play, particularly since it controls the PKK through Turkish leaders in the Qandil Mountains, like Cemil Bayik and his associates. Therefore, it prevents Assad from taking any steps that might affect the current precarious balance.
Don’t forget Russia, the most concerned party about border fragmentation, constantly worried about the republics under the Russian Federation’s umbrella and those near the Middle East, especially considering that someone might want to engage it in other wars and fronts besides Ukraine. Therefore, it has neither the intention nor the will to grant recognition that would ignite sparks spreading across the region, changing many maps. Hence, it encourages the Turks to join hands with Assad.
Watch for the word “recognition” in the upcoming events and statements, as it will control the pathways of normalization and the appetite for or against it. For these reasons, we used to tell many foolish Syrians who tolerated communication with the SDF and QSD under various pretexts: do not grant the PKK any recognition, as it would be the beginning of Syria’s disintegration, creating sectarian and ethnic entities in every inch of it according to the whims of supporters and those supported. But the game is bigger than them, and bigger than a multinational mercenary militia that came to Syria from outside to establish a new minority state alongside Assad’s state. A militia whose one of its nominal leaders now welcomes Arab normalization with Assad, provided it is accompanied by recognition of their self-administration!
Those interested can refer to a leaked warning on May 29, 2024, in “Türkiye Gazetes,” stating that America wants to establish a border state for the PKK. It also offered this to Russia and Assad, with negotiations set to start on June 11, last month.
Turkish journalist Cem Küçük commented, “In reality, if such a state is established and recognized by America, most countries around the world would choose to recognize it. This situation threatens our borders.” It wasn’t surprising that Erdogan spoke on the same issue the next day, May 30.
The word “recognition” is repeatedly mentioned, as you undoubtedly notice!
