Ibrahim Aljabin
Above all, it is illogical under any rationale to allow the opportunity for the racist practices that our Syrian citizens are subjected to in Turkey, turning Turkey from an ally into an adversary. Such an idea is akin to shooting oneself in the foot, harming both historical and current geopolitical interests. Additionally, it is unreasonable to consider Turkey’s recent stance on normalization with Assad as a reason to abandon the close relationship with Turkey, as this relationship is not hostage to the positions of governments, transient interests, populists, or racists.
What benefit would Syrians gain from this? As if they needed more enemies in this complex, morally bankrupt world! It is true that the appeals of Syrians and Turkish politicians to the Turkish government to reconsider its ambiguous path of normalization with Assad have been in vain. Turkey perceives its supreme interests, particularly regarding the PKK and its branches in Syria, as crucial. It believes that Assad’s supposed interest in extending his authority over all Syrian territory inherently means he would want to eliminate the SDF and its self-administration, making normalization and partnership with Assad the only viable option to counter this project.
But who said Assad is genuinely interested in extending his authority over all Syrian territory, or concerned about Syrian sovereignty, which he has repeatedly shown indifference to? Who said that Assad, whose regime fostered and supported the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, arming and facilitating its terrorist operations across the Syrian-Turkish border, would ever be worried about a rebellion by his protégés?
This scenario is reminiscent of Assad’s handling of Captagon, which is manufactured on Syrian soil and exported to neighboring countries and the world, only to then negotiate with these same countries to mitigate the damage caused by the drug that has inundated the region’s populations. This is a repeated scenario, similar to when Assad facilitated jihadists’ passage to Iraq through Syrian territory after the 2003 US invasion, only to later negotiate with Washington, Iraqis, and others to hand over these fighters after they returned from the battlefield, after detaining them or gathering enough information about them.
But does Turkey really not comprehend all this? Or does it have other calculations, anticipating the upcoming US elections and the potential return of President Trump and the Republicans to the White House? The ongoing pressure game between East and West could allow Turkey to maintain its interests not only in the Middle East and Syria but also within NATO and its relations with Europeans.
Turkey also views Syria in the post-Al-Aqsa flood era, anticipating Israel’s plans to ensure its security in the aftermath, not just in Gaza but also in Lebanon and Syria. This prompts Turkey to weigh between a known adversary (Assad) and an unknown entity that Israel might shape in Syria to secure its faltering security amidst escalating tensions with Iran.
All these considerations, including what Turkey knows about preparations in northeastern Syria, could be decisive factors in its choice to engage in Syria (Assad’s domain), as it is already present in northwestern Syria through its close relationship with the Syrian opposition. If Turkey enters this forbidden zone, it becomes part of the upcoming game, not merely an observer.
Now, what about the Syrian opposition?
Not long ago, we sought bold leadership positions and Syrian opposition political leaders capable of saying “no” to what UN envoy Geir Pedersen and others proposed, as we rejected the notion propagated by the Coalition and the Negotiations Committee that merely keeping the Syrian opposition file present at the negotiating table was a significant goal. Today, with the various shifts highlighted above, it is beneficial to affirm that this functional task is indeed a worthwhile gain.
The time to say “no” has come, without interfering in the sovereign decisions of Turkey or other countries wishing to normalize relations with Assad for various reasons. Conversely, Syrian opposition institutions and the spectrum of those who believe in the Syrian revolution and its goals and principles must have the courage to declare that no one has the right to impose normalization with Assad on Syrians, as others do.
But what if Syrians are compelled to follow what Turkey’s normalization with Assad necessitates? Such an outcome might indeed occur, potentially bringing numerous field and practical implications. However, hidden within this are many nuances that could benefit Syrians.
Firstly, it should be firmly established that Assad will not benefit from any normalization that Turkey might conduct with him, just as he did not benefit from Arab normalization. This is due to the nature of his regime, which resists any changes in behavior, being remnants of a system controlled by multiple factors beyond Assad’s or his normalizers’ command. Chief among these is Iran’s vision, which would inevitably be harmed by a transition from a militia era to a state era in a country like Syria, which it has deliberately turned into a quagmire of violence.
Secondly, whatever Turkey demands from Assad, it will be in exchange for what it offers him. Since Assad is incapable of fulfilling his commitments, what would compel Turkey to make free concessions? This scenario will be visible to everyone, including both Syrian and Turkish populations.
If Assad wishes to reclaim northwestern Syria, it will not happen overnight. A new reality has emerged in that region, and this reality cannot be resolved by a meeting between Erdoğan and Assad or a series of security meetings between joint committees. It cannot be dismantled by hasty decisions; otherwise, it would devolve into uncontrollable chaos. Therefore, a new equation will emerge, potentially returning Assad, declawed, with no authority over the region, to face his people again. Can he confront them in the same manner since the revolution’s onset?
Meanwhile, northeastern Syria will have transformed into a new reality, not considering the American reaction to any developments and the conditions the US will impose on all parties, should it permit, as its officials say, some form of normalization between Damascus and Ankara.
Thirdly, Turkish normalization with Assad could mark the beginning of a phase to restore Turkey’s role in influencing the Syrian political process. If this holds true, it would reintegrate Turkey into the regional influence circle. It would bear significant responsibility for reorganizing the Syrian dossier, either on behalf of or in collaboration with the concerned parties.
Trusting Turkey or any other potential political allies does not imply blind acceptance of the outcomes of normalization with Assad. Instead, confidence in Turkey’s supposed awareness of its interests, combined with Syrians’ unwavering stance without hesitation or subordination, can ensure achieving many of the demands raised over the years. Especially as everyone still clings to UN Resolution 2254, which would mean the end of the regime Assad knows and knows no other way to govern Syria, even if he deludes himself into believing he can circumvent it by appointing some opposition figures in ministries and state institutions, a minimum his decrepit regime cannot tolerate and the maximum he can offer.
We must remind everyone that Syrians have never asked the world to sever ties with Assad. Instead, they requested the international community to pressure him through those relations to stop killing the people and destroying Syria. In any case, any change in the world’s relations with Assad will not be in favor of this regime. The myth of recognition versus non-recognition, and legitimacy versus illegitimacy, ingrained by Obama in the minds of Syrians and the world, and the boycott, was merely a reward granted to Assad, allowing him and his Iranian then Russian allies to isolate the Syrian people.
For us Syrians, Assad has been illegitimate since his inheritance of power, following his father, who came to power through a coup against a Ba’ath that arrived via a coup. The Syrian revolution sought to establish popular legitimacy created through democracy and the ballot box, based on equality, justice, equal opportunities, and a state of institutions, not a state of terror and an iron fist.
Forced returnees from Lebanon to Assad’s regime are thrown into prisons, emerging dead or in intensive care units where they succumb after severe torture. Simultaneously, Vladimir Putin and the Iraqis claim they have an approach to discuss with the Turks regarding rapprochement with Assad. No one knows what will happen if Assad, who is invited to Turkey based on the Russians’ and Iraqis’ approach, demands the return of refugees registered as wanted by his regime. We might witness a new flood of horrifying images, no less dreadful than the Caesar photographs.
Moreover, the potential (indeed certain) consequences Turkey will face from normalization with Assad will not stop at Captagon and armed cells crossing borders. What else does he have?
Finally, continuing the struggle by all possible means to achieve the demands voiced by Syrians since 2011, and seeking justice and accountability for all the massacres and crimes committed against this great people, are purely Syrian functions and duties that do not lapse with time, and no one else should, or ought to, demand them on our behalf.
